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Civil Jury Trial: The Case for
Reasoned Iconoclasm
By MARY KAY KANE*
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution has
ensured that the jury trial will be a permanent part of American civil
litigation1 by providing:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
This deceptively precise language, however, does not state with any
exactness when and why juries must be employed.2 It has been left to
* B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, University of Michigan. Assistant Professor of Law,
State University of New York at Buffalo.
Professor Kane states, "I express my appreciation to the State University of New
York for a Baldy Summer Fellowship that made the research on -this article possible and
to Brian Carr, a third year law student at Buffalo, for his help in the task of digging out
state constitutions and their treatment by local courts."
1. Perhaps it should be no surprise that the jury continues to flourish. As
described by one commentator, the jury "is one of the most durable and stubborn of all
human institutions. The clans and tribes where it originated have dissolved into
unrecorded history and are lbng forgotten. Kingdoms and world empires arose and
vanished but the jury held on." Pope, The Jury, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 426, 448 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Pope]. A nonexplanation for this phenomenon is offered by Judge
Frank: "The point is that the jury, once popular thanks to its efficacy as a protection
against oppression, has become embedded in our customs, our traditions. And matters
traditional are likely to be regarded as inherent rights." J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 139
(1973) [hereinafter cited as FRANK]. Professor Moore comments: "The jury is like rock
music. Classical theory frowns; the masses applaud. And in a democracy the felt need
of the masses has a claim upon the law." 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.02[1] at
15 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as MooRE].
2. The purposes and functions of the civil jury ostensibly are many. Judge
Jerome Frank lists and then refutes, the following five: 1) juries are better fact finders;
2) juries can nullify harsh or arbitrary laws; 3) juries protect citizens against overbearing, incompetent and perhaps corrupt judges; 4) participation on juries is a means of
educating the public about the government; and 5) juries permit popular participation in
government. FRANK, supra note 1, at 126-37. In addition, it has been suggested that
juries perform the necessary role of alleviating latent conflicts between the litigants
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the courts, and ultimately to the Supreme Court, to define the scope of
civil jury trial rights.
The traditional method of determining whether a litigant has the
right to a jury trial in federal court is the "historical approach." Under
this traditional approach, the Supreme Court has inquired whether the
particular case in question would have been tried at law or in equity in
1791, the year in which the seventh amendment was ratified. Although
the historical approach may be justified under a literal and restrictive
interpretation of the seventh amendment, it has been criticized as unrealistic, as it results in a "distribution of responsibility based on an
historical division largely motivated by factors now irrelevant."' Thus,
commentators have advocated a modernization of the historical test
which would take into account the disappearance of conditions that in
the 18th century required the protection of the vox populi in civil
matters. 4 According to this view, the common law jury's function was
very specifically to protect citizens from unfair trials, and if a jury would
not protect people from unfair trials, then its use would be dysfunctional. The seventh amendment in such cases should not require trial by
jury. Thus, this "functional approach" focuses on whether the judge is
in a better position than the jury to decide a particular case in a fashion
comporting with notions of fair and efficient justice; the benefits of a
jury would be preserved for those cases in which they could best bear
fruit and would be eliminated for others in which the disadvantages
outweighed the benefits. 5
The debate over the propriety of a functional jury trial test has
raged for several years, and an evaluation of it is due. The Supreme
(society) and the judge (judiciary) and thus must be preserved. Wolf, Trial by Jury: A
Sociological Analysis, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 820. See also Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil
Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055 (1964).
3. Note, The Right to a Non-jury Trial, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 1176, 1190 (1961).
4. F. JAMES, Cvn. PRocEDuRu
§ 8.3, at 347 (1965); McCoid, ProceduralReform
and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as McCoid]; Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of
Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HAnV. L. REv. 442 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as Shapiro & Coquillette].
5. The functional approach does not necessitate the complete and potentially
unconstitutional abandonment of historical inquiry, or the restriction of jury trial in all
cases. Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 4, at 447, suggest that when faced with a jury
trial problem, the court should make some historical inquiry, but then should ask itself

whether factors exist that favor jury trial even if history does not compel it. On the other
hand, a functional approach might result in fewer jury trials in complex areas, such as
trademarks, antitrust, securities law, fraud, and perhaps even some personal injury or
wrongful death cases arising out of mass disasters. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531,

545 n.5 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Court has sufficiently outlined the scope of seventh amendment rights to

allow lawyers and academicians to assess the current viability of a
functional approach. In particular, the Supreme Court in 1974 upheld
a defendant's right to demand a jury trial in two cases, Curtis v.
Loether6 and Pernell v. Southall Realty,7 notwithstanding some legislative evidence that trial by jury was not desired by Congress and might
even have resulted in undermining the policies of the statutes involved.
These cases would appear to be perfect paradigms for analyzing the
power of Congress and the courts to determine jury rights in light of the

jury's ability to fulfill its historic role of dispensing justice.
This article will attempt to reconcile the functional test with the
various pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the scope of the

seventh amendment. It will demonstrate that, prior to the Loether and
Pernell decisions, the Supreme Court was indeed retreating from a rigid

historical test toward a more functional approach and that neither
Loether nor Pernell need necessarily spell the end of a flexible and

functional seventh amendment doctrine. Finally, this article will suggest an analytical basis for utilizing scientific evidence to determine

whether juries are in fact serving in their historical capacity as guardians
of justice.

General History of Constitutional Jury Rights
Historically, the right to a jury trial in the federal courts" depended
6. 415 U.S. 189 (1974). Although the plaintiff remained the same throughout
the litigation, the case will be referred to by the defendant's name, Loether, throughout
this article. The plaintiff married between the appellate and Supreme Court decisions
and her married name, Curtis, was substituted for her maiden name, Rogers. Id. at 191
n.3.
7. 416 U.S. 363 (1974), noted in 24 CATHOLIC U.L. Rav. 155 (1974).
8. The states have been free to implement their own concepts of civil jury trial.
See note 19 infra. Most states have constitutional jury trial provisions similar to the
federal guarantee. However, by judicial construction or by statute, these state provisions
have been applied in varying ways. For a complete discussion of the states that abide by
a law-equity dichotomy, see Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Merged Procedures, 65
HARV. L. Rv. 453 (1952).
Some of the state jury trial provisions differ from the federal constitution. See, e.g.,
MAss. CO ST. art. 15; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 25; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11. Nonetheless,
they uniformly have been interpreted in the same fashion as the federal guarantee and
civil jury trial rights are deemed to be those which existed at the time their respective
constitutions were adopted. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 591, 130 N.E.
685 (1921); Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 467, 102 N.E. 665 (1913);
Groves v. Ware, 182 N.C. 553, 109 S.E. 568 (1921); Chowan & S.R.R. v. Parker, 105
N.C. 184, 11 S.E. 328 (1890); Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351,
105 S.E. 141 (1920).
Four states do not have explicit constitutional provisions for civil jury trial. Article
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upon the interpretation given to the words "suits at common law."9 This
phrase from the seventh amendment contemplates the minimum of situations in which the right to a jury trial cannot be abrogated.'" A jury
trial can, of course, be granted in actions which were not suits at

common law, but a jury trial cannot be denied where the action must be
so classified.

The federal courts have turned to English history to determine
whether actions were suits at common law."

Although the wisdom of

2, section twenty-three of the Colorado Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury
only in criminal prosecutions, and it mentions civil juries only to provide that they may
consist of less than twelve persons. Such rights are determined by COLO. R. CIV. PRO. 38,
as well as other statutory enactments. Similarly, in Louisiana the right to jury trial in
civil cases has been held to rest with the state legislature. City Bank v. Banks, 1 La.
Ann. 418 (1842). Article one, section ten of the Utah Constitution also explicitly provides for jury trial only in criminal prosecutions. Nonetheless, some courts have assumed a constitutional right in civil actions based on section 78-21-1 of the Utah Code of
Civil Procedure. See Degnan, Right to Civil Jury Trial in Utah: Constitution and Statute, 8 UTAH L. REV. 97 (1962). Similarly in Wyoming, which also has no constitutional
provisions for civil jury trials, the Wyoming Supreme Court has assumed the existence of
a constitutional right. See First Nat'l Bank v. Foster, 9 Wyo. 157, 61 P. 466 (1900).
9. One commentator has suggested several methods that could have occurred to
the constitutional convention delegates during the ratification debates as alternative
methods of deciding when jury trials were required. See Wolfram, The Constitutional
History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 711-12 (1973).
10. The seventh amendment does not purport to establish maximal jury trial rights
and thus does not provide in itself any guarantee of a right to a nonjury trial. See Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959); Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136 F.2d 796
(D.C. Cir. 1943); Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1176 (1961).
Indeed, it is well established that the Congress can enact a statutory right of jury trial
broader than the seventh amendment. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co,
374 U.S. 16 (1963) (Jones Act); Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 443, 459 (1851) (Great Lakes Act).
In a similar vein, there is a right to trial by jury in equity cases in Georgia,
Tennessee and Texas. See Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv.
157 (1953). Jury trial is available in equity cases even though those states have
constitutional guarantees similar to the federal provision, providing that the right to trial
by jury shall remain inviolate. GA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 16(1); TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 6;
TEXAS CONST. art. 1, § 15, art. V, § 10. Tennessee is noteworthy because it maintains
separate law and equity courts. Texas, on the other hand, has a civil law history, so
distinctions between law and equity for jury trial or any other purposes make little sense.
11. Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Wonson, 28
F. Cas. 745, 750 (No. 16,750) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
For historical background, see 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *349; P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 5-14 (1956) [hereinafter cited as DEVLIN]; W.
FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JuRY 6-14 (1852); W. HOLDSWORTH, 1 A HISTORY OF

ENGLISH LAw 312 (7th ed. rev. 1956); T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 107-09 (4th ed. 1948); 1 F. POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 140 (2d ed. reissued 1968); R. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE
ENGLISH COMMON LAW 75 (1963); Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARV. L.

REv. 249 (1892).
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this approach has been questioned, 12 it is clear from the weight of
precedent that the search for the right to a jury trial in a civil case must
begin with an analysis of English common law at the time the seventh
amendment was adopted.13 Stated simply, rights or remedies not enforceable at law 14 at that time do not require a jury trial,' 5 whereas the
right adheres when rights or remedies are so enforceable.' 6
12.

Unfortu-

See McCoid, supra note 4, at 1-2. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRocE uaE § 2302 at 16, 17 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT &

PRACTICE AND
MILLER].

It is to be observed that the allocation of business between common law and equity
courts in the eighteenth century seldom depended on the right to jury trial. Indeed,
some commentators have noted that, rather than the availability of a right to jury trial
influencing persons to sue at law, litigants chose to sue in equity because of defects in the
jury trial system. 3 W. BLACSTONE, Co~,mm-APmms or THm LAws OF ENGLAND *38285 (juries locally prejudiced). There was a decline in jury popularity in the fifteenth
century due to "complaints that juries were packed, bribed, intimidated, partial and difficult to obtain within any reasonable space of time." T. PLUCKNETr, A CoNciSE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 169 (4th ed. 1948).
13. It is interesting to note that were American courts to refer to present English
law, civil jury trial would be available as a matter of right only in cases for libel, slander,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, breach of promise of marriage, and
to defendants in fraud actions. Administration of Justice Act of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5,
c. 36, § 6.
The reasons for the decline of jury trial in England appears to be a desire for
greater certainty in outcome. This is not to say that the jury is viewed as any less an
instrument of justice than when it was first instituted, but that the jury's ability to move
towards the aequum et bonum is outweighed by the increased predictability of judge
trials. See DEvLUN, supra note 11, at 146-57. See also Ward v. James, 1 All E.R. 563
(C.A. 1965).
Jury trial has also fallen into disfavor during the twentieth century in Switzerland,
Germany, France, and Scotland. FRANK, supra note 1, at 109.
14. "By common law, they meant what the constitution denominated in the third
article 'law;' not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and
settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined,
in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable
remedies were administered; or where, as in admiralty, a mixture of public law, and of
maritime law and equity was often found in the same suit." Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) (Story, J.).
15. Actions seeking injunctive relief are purely equitable and no jury trial need be
provided. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
Kleenize Chem. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
The denial of jury trial has been upheld in various suits dealing with other equitable
matters. Guthrie Nat'1 Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528 (1899) (claims against municipal
corporation having no legal obligation); Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) (action
against receiver); Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253 (1855) (settlement of an
estate). Cf. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). A good collection of cases held to be
equitable can be found in Moonn, supra note 1, 38.11[6], at 121-27.
But see Chesnin & Hazard, Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: Jury
Trial of Issues in Equity Cases Before 1791, 83 YALz L.J. 999 (1974).
16. Black v. Jackson, 177 U.S. 349 (1900).
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nately, this proposition, though technically accurate, has proven too
simple an answer to all the questions which have arisen, particularly in
the context of modem litigation. Consequently, the Supreme Court has
attempted on several occasions to clarify seventh amendment rights in
modem contexts.
By and large, the trend in the Court has been to expand the scope
of the constitutional guarantee 1 7 and to find a right to jury trial in
doubtful cases. 8 The major exceptions have been the Court's refusal to
apply the seventh amendment to the states through the fourteenth
amendment" and its approval of six member20 and nonunanimous
17. Apparently the trend prior to 1936 was not to expand the number and types of
cases in which jury trial rights were afforded. See, e.g., James, Trial by Jury and the
New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022, 1026 (1936). After 1936 the
pendulum swung in the opposite direction. Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A
Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 320 (1951).
18. Wlasrr & MILLER, supra note 12, at 21. See generally McCoid, supra
note 4, at 1; Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 1176 (1961).
19. See Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551 (1833). The rationale
for the Court's decision in Livingston is presented in a case decided the same year
involving the applicability of the fifth amendment to the states. Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); accord, Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931); Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S. 226
(1923); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875); Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
532, 557 (1874); Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 274 (1869). A recent scholarly
judicial opinion on the question whether the seventh amendment is incorporated under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F.
Supp. 1025 (E.D. La. 1972) (Wisdom, J.), aff'd sub nom. Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S.
943 (1972) (per curiam), and Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973) (per curiam).
See also Karlen, Can A State Abolish the Civil Jury?, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 103.
20. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). The decision relied heavily on
the Court's earlier holding that the six member jury in a state prosecution did not violate
the sixth amendment. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). Whether six member
juries may be employed in federal criminal prosecutions has not yet been decided. An
important feature of these cases is the approach taken by the Court: "The relevant
inquiry, as we see it, must be the function that the particular feature performs and its
relation to the purposes of the jury trial." Id. at 99-100.
The number twelve appears to have been fixed during the reign of Henry II during
the twelfth century. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HIv.L. REv. 249, 295
(1892). Why that number was chosen is unclear. Pope, supra note 1, at 435. One
commentator, perhaps with tongue in cheek, offers the following explanation: "It is
clear that what was wanted was a number that was large enough to create a formidable
body of opinion in favor of the side that won; and doubtless the reason for having twelve
instead of ten, eleven or thirteen was much the same as gives twelve pennies to the
shilling and which exhibits an early English abhorrence of the decimal system." DEVLIN,
supra note 11, at 8. Thus, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court found no
compelling reason to require a twelve member jury. The Court's analysis of that
question has been criticized. See, e.g., Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The
Dimunition of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CH. L. REV.710 (1971).
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juries.2 1 Thus, it is not without some justification that two commentators have concluded, "[A]ny close question-and sometimes one that is
not so close-is resolved in favor of the jury trial right without serious
analysis of history, precedent, or policy."2 The Court's decisions concerning jury rights since the merger of law and equity in the federal
system in 193828 illustrate this philosophy, as well as a tendency to
abandon a purely historical approach.
Jury Trial and Multiple Claims

The first chink in the armor of the strictly historical test came in
the landmark case of Beacon Theatres, Inc v. Westover.2 4 In that case,

Fox had sued Beacon for a declaratory judgment that its exclusive "firstrun" movie contracts were not in violation of the Sherman and Clayton
Antitrust Acts and for a preliminary injunction to prevent Beacon from
bringing an antitrust suit against it until the ongoing action was completed. Beacon asserted a compulsory antitrust counterclaim for treble
damages and demanded its right to a jury trial on that claim. It argued
that there was a common issue to the claim and counterclaim and that to
try the original claim first to the judge would result in denying Beacon
its jury trial rights, as the common issue would then be decided without
21. It has long been supposed that a unanimous verdict is an essential feature of
the right to jury trial. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897). The
historic reason for that requirement was unclear. See W. FoasYTH, HISTORY OF TRuIL
BY JuRY 239 (1852); Pope, supra note 1, at 436. However, in 1972 the Supreme Court
ruled in two cases that the states were not bound by the sixth and fourteenth amendments
to require unanimity in state criminal prosecutions. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). Although these cases are not
controlling in the civil area, it has been argued that "the requirement of unanimity is so
much more important in criminal cases than in civil cases that it would be quite
anomalous to find that the Constitution imposes the requirement in the latter cases but
not in the former." WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 12, § 2492, at 482. Nonetheless,
unanimity may still be required in federal cases since the courts may be reluctant to
allow the alteration of the jury process by both the six member jury and the nonunanmous verdict simultaneously. But cf. N.Y.R. Civ. PRAC. §§ 4104, 4113(a).
22. Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 4, at 442.
23. It is no accident that problems as to when jury trial is required proliferated in
the federal courts after the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity was
abolished in 1938. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2. Prior to that time, jury trial questions could
be decided easily because the existence of the right depended on the court in which the
action was brought. Under the new federal civil rules, actions combining legal and
equitable claims and defenses were permissible, and it was unclear how jury trial rights
were affected. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c), 18(a). See generally Note, The Effect of the
Merger of Law and Equity on the Right of the Jury Trial in FederalCourts, 36 GEO. LJ.
666 (1948).
24. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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recourse to a jury. The court of appeals ruled that Fox had made a
valid claim for equitable relief and noted that under the equitable cleanup doctrine,2 5 ancient courts of equity could retain jurisdiction over and
dispose of equitable claims even though, in so doing, legal issues also
were decided. Therefore, it felt justified in ordering that Fox's equitable claims be heard by the trial judge first, even though that determination would bind the jury, and Beacon's right to a jury determination
of the facts would be seriously debilitated.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black, disagreed
and, in doing so, abandoned the traditional approach to determining
jury trial rights on the basis of a characterization of the entire lawsuit as
either equitable or legal. Justice Black criticized the court of appeals
for relying on the clean-up doctrine to decide the case. The basic
requirements for equitable relief, inadequacy of remedy and irreparable
harm, were practical terms, he said. "As such their existence today
must be determined, not by precedents decided under discarded procedures, but in light of the remedies now made available by the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules."2 Since in the federal courts
equity had only acted where legal remedies were inadequate, Justice
Black reasoned, the expansion of adequate legal remedies worked to
narrow the scope of equity. The same federal court was empowered to
hear equitable and legal claims simultaneously, and the old rule of
equity no longer made any sense. Therefore, the equitable jurisdiction
had to give way. Fox could defend itself adequately at law against
Beacon's counterclaim, and all issues common to the equitable claim
and the legal claim would be tried first to a jury.2 7 Stated more
generally, this holding makes it clear that when the current legal remedy
is adequate, a court can assume that equity would abandon jurisdiction
to the extent issues can be decided at law, and to that extent a jury trial
28
must be provided on demand.
25.

For a description of the equitable clean-up doctrine, see D.

DOBBS, REMEDIES

§ 2.7 (1973); Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U.
PA. L. REv.320 (1951).

26. 359 U.S. at 507. The Court specifically held that the Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970), did not affect jury trial rights. A good discussion of
the right to jury trial in declaratory judgment actions is provided in Comment, Right to
Trial by Jury in DeclaratoryJudgment Actions, 3 CoNN. L. Rnv. 564 (1971).

27. Conversely, in some instances it still may be appropriate to try the equitable
issues first, as when doing so could decide the entire controversy where deciding the legal
issues first would not produce the same results. See, e.g., Holiday Inns of America, Inc.
v. Lussi, 42 F.R.D. 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
28. See McCoid, supra note 4, at 1; Rothstein, Beacon Theatres and the Constitutional Right to Jury Trial, 51 A.B.A.J. 1145 (1965); Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 4,
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These principles were reenforced and further extended in the subsequent opinion of Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,2 9 also authored by Mr.
Justice Black. That case involved a failure to make payments pursuant
to a trademark licensing agreement. The plaintiff sought temporary
and permanent injunctions against defendant's use of the trademark, an
accounting to determine what was owing under the contract, and an
injunction pending the accounting to prevent the defendant from collecting receipts. The defendant filed an answer, including an antitrust
counterclaim, and demanded a jury trial.
Following his approach in Beacon Theatres, Mr. Justice Black
again established that historical rules should be applied in light of
modem procedure. He found that the availability of a master under the
federal rules30 usually provided an adequate legal replacement for the
equitable remedy of an accounting, so that the accounting claim should
now be deemed an action at law, requiring a trial by jury.
Further, the Court tolled the death knell for the equitable clean-up
doctrine. That doctrine, a remnant of the days when the equity and law
courts were separate entities, was no longer tenable under the modem
rules allowing both equitable and legal issues to be presented in the
same case. Thus, reasoned Justice Black:
Beacon Theatres requires that any legal issues for which a trial by
jury is timely and properly demanded be submitted to a jury ....
[T]he sole question [to be decided] is whether the31action now
pending before the District Court contains legal issues.
Dairy Queen, then, was firm precedent for the proposition that the
parties did not lose their seventh amendment rights when legal and
equitable issues were mixed; whatever doubts were left by Beacon
Theatres on this score completely evaporated. 32
The Issue Test
The last case decided by the Supreme Court concerning the effect
of the merger of law and equity on the right to jury trial is Ross v.
Bernhard.33 That case involved the question whether there was a right
442; Comment, From Beacon Theatres to Dairy Queen to Ross: The Seventh Amendment, The Federal Rules, and a Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy, 48 J. UDAN L. 459,

483 (1971).
29. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
31. 369 U.S. at 473.
32. The right to a jury trial in Beacon Theatres had derived from an implied
congressional intent that antitrust matters be tried to a jury. Thus, there had been some
doubt whether Beacon Theatres was, strictly speaking, a seventh amendment case.
33, 396 TJ.S. 531 (1970).
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to jury trial on the corporate claim in a shareholder derivative suit under
the Investment Company Act of 1940. Although corporations were
allowed to sue at common law to enforce their own rights and could
demand a jury trial, the ability of a stockholder to bring a derivative
action on behalf of the corporation was confined to equity. Both the
issue of whether a derivative suit was proper and the underlying corporate claim were tried by the chancery court. The Supreme Court,
however, upheld the right to trial by jury. Mr. Justice White, writing for
the majority, rested his decision first on an interpretation of Beacon
Theatres and Dairy Queen as holding that jury trial questions depend
upon "the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of
the overall action,"3 4 and second on his view of the derivative suit as
divisible into two units: an equitable issue concerning the standing of
the stockholder plaintiff and the legal issues inherent in the corporate
35
claim.
The most noteworthy aspect of Ross is the Court's continued
flexible approach of reassessing history.8 6 In addition, the adoption of
the issue test represents a significant expansion in judicial discretion in
deciding jury questions, since, as indicated by the dissent, "there are, for
the most part, no such things as inherently 'legal issues' or inherently
'equitable issues.' There are only factual issues, and 'like chameleons
[they] take their color from surrounding circumstances.'
34.

Id. at 538.

35. In a strong dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Harlan and Chief Justice
Berger, argued that there was no joinder of legal and equitable claims, since derivative
suits historically were tried entirely in equity. Therefore, he argued, Beacon Theatres
and Dairy Queen were inapposite; those cases involved the joinder of claims that would
have been tried separately in 1791. 396 U.S. at 543. For similar arguments, see
Comment, From Beacon Theatres to Dairy Queen to Ross: The Seventh Amendment,
The Federal Rules and a Receding Law-Equity Dichotomy, 48 J. URBAN L. 459, 503
(1971).

36. It has been suggested that Ross effectively breaks with the historical approach
to jury trial questions, requiring in future cases "[o]nly two rather simple inquiries: 1)
whether the issues pertaining to legal relief can be untangled from the equitable issues;
2) whether merger makes it practicable to try the former to a jury." The Supreme
Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 172, 175 (1970). This interpretation seems too
broad, however. Clearly the Supreme Court is not yet ready to abandon history.
Moreover, the Court may not be able to ignore the historical division between law and
equity given the present wording of the seventh amendment. See Note, Ross v.
Bernhard: The Uncertain Future of the Seventh Amendment, 81

YALE

L.J. 112, 122

(1971). The Court's reference to and use of history in two recent opinions emphasizes
this fact. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416
U.S. 363 (1974).

37.

See notes 73-107 & accompanying text infra.

396 U.S. at 550.
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This decreased emphasis on purely historical solutions is particularly apparent in a cryptic footnote to the majority opinion:
As our cases indicate, the 'legal' nature of an issue is determined
by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such
questions, second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring
extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the
most difficult to apply. 38
Perhaps most important in this quotation is the reference to "the practical abilities and limitations of juries." The seventh amendment itself
makes no mention of factors other than history that should be considered. Policy considerations or practical concerns were never openly
considered in prior Supreme Court jury decisions, except in the cases
upholding the six member jury,39 and in those instances the Court had
first concluded that the Constitution did not mandate the manner in
which the jury must operate. Thus, assuming this language can be
taken seriously, the use of the issue test ( a more vague, and hence more
flexible, means of deciding seventh amendment questions) and the
injection of policy considerations into this inquiry appear to represent a
movement toward a truly functional jury trial test. Thus, Ross remains
as a further, and arguably much more radical, extension of the trend
begun by Beacon Theatres.
The difficulty with this interpretation is that, without exception, all
of the Supreme Court's pronouncements occurred in contexts enlarging the right to jury trial, not diminishing it. Thus, since the
seventh amendment provides only for minimal, not maximal, jury trial
rights, the Court was not severely hampered by constitutional restrictions when it continued to adopt tests expanding those rights. In doing
so, the Court never addressed the question of whether the right to jury
trial could be constitutionally restricted by a test including nonhistoric
factors.
In summary, seventh amendment questions have been addressed by
the Supreme Court in an increasingly flexible, pragmatic manner. The
trend, at least since the merger of law and equity in the federal system,
has been to refer to history to decide jury issues and also to take into
account modem changes which have rendered moot the reasons for
which a jury trial may have been denied in 1791. In addition, factors
other than historical analogy have been used for the first time. In this
way, the Court has indicated that a functional jury trial test may be per38. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
39. See cases cited note 20 supra.
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missible and, further, that evidence relevant to the "practical abilities
and limitations" of juries may be considered.
Jury Trial and the Congress
Central to any discussion of functional jury trial concepts is an
exploration of the congressional power to provide for a statutory cause
of action that dispenses with trial by jury, even though the remedy or the
underlying claim for relief could be considered analogous to an historic
common law action. This in effect entails consideration of whether
Congress can declare an action "equitable" or "non-legal" for jury trial
purposes. Indeed, in many ways this legislative power is the most
important seventh amendment issue for the future. The growing complexity of modem life has in general necessitated resort to statutory
remedies in preference to the slower, more haphazard development of
the common law. The effectiveness of some statutory remedies will
obviously be severely curtailed if litigants can insist upon a jury trial.
Thus, the adoption of a functional approach to seventh amendment
questions may be essential to many federal statutory schemes; in its
absence, the seventh amendment may prove to be not so much a
provision to protect against governmental oppression as a tool of abuse,
serving to obstruct justice.
Whether the functional approach is possible in the statutory context depends upon the acceptance of two propositions: first, that pure
policy considerations are factors properly considered in seventh amendment inquiries; and second, that congressional statements of policy are
relevant in determining the outcome of these inquiries. 4' The previously discussed line of decisions culminating in Ross v. Bernhard provides
sufficient authority for the injection of policy factors into questions of
jury trial rights. It is the second proposition with which we will now
concern ourselves.
40. Although Congress may provide a statutory remedy, the Supreme Court has
the sole authority to determine whether the seventh amendment requires that a jury trial
be available to those who exercise the remedy. Thus, congressional findings on jury
inadequacy would be relevant to, but never binding upon the Court's determination.

However, this does not mean that the courts could not benefit from congressional
consideration of the abilities and limitations of the jury in specific contexts. See, e.g.,
Chilton v. National Cash Register Co., 370 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Ohio 1974). Indeed, one
student note has suggested that the Court should defer to the congressional findings by
applying a rational basis test, arguing that the ability to investigate the question

thoroughly places Congress in a better position to make a determination.

Note,

CongressionalProvision for Nonjury Trial Under the Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J.
401, 416 (1973).

September 19761
September 1976J

CIVI J.URY TRIAL
CIVIL JURY TRIAL

General Approach to Statutory Actions

In adjudicating statutory causes of action for which Congress has
failed to provide expressly for trial by jury, federal courts4 1 generally

have tended to presume that Congress implicitly provided for the right or
relied on the presence of the constitutional guarantee to supply it.42 For
example, there are, in suits under the antitrust laws 43 and the Federal

Employers' Liability Act,44 references by the Supreme Court to the
41. In general, the state courts appear to apply the same test as the federal courts
to statutory actions. But see Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial
Power, 19 MINN. L. REv. 261, 264 (1935). A few examples follow.
In California, jury trial is guaranteed by constitution and statute. CAL. CONsr. art.
I, § 16; CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. § 592 (West 1976). The test for jury trial is whether the
"gist of the action" is legal. People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 299,
231 P.2d 832, 843 (1951). Thus in One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe the California Supreme
Court held that a jury trial was required in a forfeiture proceeding under the California
Health and Safety Code, because "[a]s early as 1301, a case involving forfeiture of a
ship and goods for piracy was tried by a jury." Id. at 291, 231 P.2d at 838. The court
specifically rejected arguments that actions under the code were outside the constitutional
guarantee because the forfeiture statute was enacted after the constitution was adopted,
holding that jury trial is not limited to those types of cases which existed at that time,
but is extended to cases of like nature. Id. at 300, 231 P.2d at 844. See Grossblatt v.
Wright, 108 Cal. App. 2d 475, 239 P.2d 19- (1951) (action under the Housing and Rent
Act of 1947).
Minnesota also has a constitutional right to jury trial. MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 4.
The jury test for statutory proceedings in Minnesota is whether jury trial was guaranteed
in a similar type proceeding under the laws of the territory when the constitution was
adopted. See, e.g., Hawley v. Wallace, 137 Minn. 183, 163 N.W. 127 (1917) (action to
contest election); Peters v. City of Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 137 N.W. 390 (1912) (action
to register a land title); Yanish v. Pioneer Fuel Co., 64 Minn. 175, 66 N.W. 198 (1896)
(insolvency proceeding); Board of County Comm'rs v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 178 (1875)
(action for overdue property taxes).
New York follows an approach similar to Minnesota, freezing the right to jury trial
as of the adoption of its constitution in 1894. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2. See generally, 4
J. WEINsTiN, H. KoRN & A. MILLER, NEW YoRK CIVIL PRACTICE § 4101.06-.08. Thus
in actions under statutes enacted after the constitution it is necessary to do some
historical research to determine how they would have been treated at that time. See,
e.g., Sporza v. German Say. Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908); Malone v. St. Peter's
& Paul's Church, 172 N.Y. 269, 64 N.E. 961 (1902).
42. Steffen v. Farmers Elevator Serv. Co., 109 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Iowa 1952);
Geneux v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 98 F. Supp. 405 (W.D. La. 1951); Bouis v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 98 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. La. 1951).
In Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961), an action to collect delinquent
taxes, Judge Friendly reasoned that in order to declare that there was no right to a jury
trial under the tax statutes, there must be a clear indication that the Congress intended
that there be no jury trial.
43. Trial by jury "is, in fact, an essential part of the congressional plan for making
competition rather than monopoly the rule of trade . . . ." Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959).
44. Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); accord, Dice v. Akron, C. &
Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
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essential part played by jury trials in these statutory schemes,4 5 even
though the relevant statutes themselves do not provide for or refer to
trial by jury.

In the absence of a basis for presuming a congressional intent to
provide for trial by jury, the court must decide whether the seventh
amendment mandates a jury trial. 46 The vast majority of liability
statutes merely codify existing common law rights.4 7 As a consequence,
most statutory actions produce the same analytical problems discussed in
the previous section, and the courts generally attempt to find an analogous 18th century counterpart to the new action in order to determine if
the constitutional guarantee is applicable. In most cases, this produces
few difficulties.4 8 For instance, in actions under the patent,4 9 securiJury trial is expressly made an essential ingredient of the Jones Act, covering
personal injuries of seamen suffered during employment. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
45. The question of statutory jury rights is decided largely by the language used by
the Congress. Illustratively, it has been held that there is a right to jury trial in an
action to recover allegedly illegal estate tax assessments, since the implementing legislation refers to "a suit at law." Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101 (1927). More
generally, actions for tax refunds are entitled to jury trial under 28 U.S.C. § 2402
(1970), specifically providing for jury trial in actions against the federal government. On
the other hand, it was held that there was no right to a jury trial in an action to enforce
three internal revenue subpoenas under the tax code since the statute referred only to
"adjudication of the issues by the United States District Court." Kennedy v. Rubin, 254
F. Supp. 190, 194 (N.D. Ill. 1966). A full discussion of constitutional jury trial rights
in tax cases brought by the government is provided in Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46
(2d Cir. 1961).
46. A problem in finding implicit jury trial rights arguably could arise because
some statutes provide explicitly for jury trial, and others are silent on the question,
creating the negative implication that no jury trial was intended. However, the courts
have not been so restrictive. Several federal statutes set out explicit jury trial rights. See
MooRE, supra note 1, at § 38.12. Implicit rights have easily been found in other
statutes. See notes 43-44 supra.
47. See Simmons v. Textile Workers Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir.
1965).
48. At times, however, the use of an historical test in the statutory field has caused
some problems, as analogies may be far from perfect. The courts often have strained to
find a right to jury trial and confusion has resulted. Condemnation suits provide a
good illustration. The power of eminent domain was exclusively statutory in England
and each statute condemning certain property set out whether a jury trial on the issue of
damages was to be provided. Beatty v. United States, 203 F. 620, 624-25 (4th Cir.
1913). If a citizen wanted to claim that the Crown had invaded his right, he proceeded
in the Chancery Court. Thus, it has been held that the seventh amendment is not
applicable in such cases. Welch v. TVA, 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
688 (1939). However, an early Supreme Court decision held that because the jury had
always assessed damages at common law, and a condemnation suit is much like the
action in trespass, there is a right to a jury trial in those suits. See, e.g., Chappell v.
United States, 160 U.S. 499 (1896).
49. Patent infringement suits frequently seek both damages and an injunction
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ties,5" and trademark laws, " the Naturalization Act of 1906,52 and the
Selective Training and Service Act, 53 the courts have found a constitu-

tional right to jury trial depending upon whether damages were sought or
whether injunctive or restitutionary relief was demanded. In suits
seeking statutory penalties, courts have defined the right being asserted

as one which at common law would have been treated as an action on a

54
debt with jury trial required.
There are a few key instances, however, when Congress has clearly

expressed a preference for nonjury trial. We must turn to the Supreme
Court's attempts to reconcile the seventh amendment with these congres-

sional determinations to avoid jury trial to see just how much leeway
there is for a functional approach to jury trial in the area of statutory

rights.
Statutory Proceedings
In 1937 the Supreme Court decided NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin

Steel Corp.,55 upholding a provision of the National Labor Relations
Act5 which empowered the Board to make findings of fact which were
preventing future use of the patent. Since Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469
(1962), it has been held that whenever a damage claim is included jury trial is required.
Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249 (3d Cir. 1969); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d
406 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965). Contra, Railex Corp. v. Joseph
Guss & Sons, Inc., 40 F.R.D. 119 (D.D.C. 1966). The Railex court applied the preDairy Queen test in patent suits, focusing on whether damages were the primary or
incidental relief sought. See, e.g., Innersprings, Inc. v. Joseph Aronauer, Inc., 27 F.R.D.
32 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
50. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250 (D. Md. 1971)
(rescission and damages sought and a jury trial granted).
51. Since damages were sought, a jury request was granted in Holiday Inns of
America, Inc. v. Lussi, 42 F.R.D. 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1967). The following cases
sought injunctive relief and jury trial demands were denied accordingly. Sheila's Shine
Prods., Inc. v. Sheila Shine, Inc., 486 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1973); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
Kleenize Chem. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ga. 1961).
Some trademark cases have held that when the suit seeks injunctive relief and an
accounting for profits, no jury trial is necessary. They distinguish Dairy Queen on the
ground that that suit was essentially one for breach of contract, a typical common law
action, whereas trademark suits were traditionally equitable in character, with the
accounting treated as incidental relief. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Cahill, 330 F. Supp.
354 (W.D. Okla. 1971); Coca-Cola Co. v. Wright, 55 F.R.D. 11 (W.D. Tenn. 1971).
52. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913).
53. Strelitz v. Surrey Classics, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
54. United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.NJ. 1950); United States v.
Mesna, 11 F.R.D. 86 (D. Minn. 1950).
.55. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 160 (1970).
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conclusive on review and to issue orders concerning challenged labor
practices.

The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,

overruled the defendant's seventh amendment objections, stating: "the
instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit.
The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory
proceeding.15 7 Thus it appears that the Congress has the power to
define some causes of action as outside the scope of the seventh amendment by providing for their enforcement through a "statutory proceed'58
ing.
But what constitutes a statutory proceeding?"
An examination
of cases after Jones & Laughlin provides few, if any, insights. A few
57. 301 U.S. at 48-49.
58. State courts also often deny jury trial by denominating the action a "special
proceeding," indicating that it is outside the respective state constitutional jury trial
guarantees. Unfortunately, the state decisions define the term no more specifically than
do the federal opinions. However, a brief recitation of some of the holdings will
illustrate the types of cases that have been denied jury trial on those grounds.
The most commonly recognized special proceeding at the state level is probate. See,
e.g., In re Dolbeer's Estate, 153 Cal. 652, 96 P. 266 (1908). See also cases cited note 70
in!ra.
Arbitration proceedings also have been held outside the scope of a state constitution
on the ground that they are a preliminary procedure, not "an action." Motor Vehicle
Accident Indem. Corp. v. Stein, 23 App. Div. 526, 255 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1965); accord, In
re Andolina, 23 App. Div. 2d 958, 259 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1965). Arbitration, however, was
not historically tried at law; indeed, it was not a judicial proceeding.
An early California case held that an action to determine the amount due as
compensation for the condemnation of private property was not an action at law.
Koppikus v. State Capitol Comm'rs, 16 Cal. 248 (1860). This case is particularly interesting in light of the federal condemnation cases to the contrary. See cases cited note 48
supra.
One early Minnesota case held that although actions challenging the state's authority to tax would require a jury trial, tax proceedings to determine how much tax should
have been assessed would not because they were "summary proceedings" and must be so
for administrative reasons. Board of County Comm'rs v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 178, 183
(1875).
A similar finding of administrative need for summary proceedings was made in
criminal actions based on the violation of municipal ordinances and nonjury trial
consequently was upheld. City of St. Paul v. Robinson, 129 Minn. 383, 152 N.W. 777
(1915); City of Mankato v. Arnold, 36 Minn. 62, 30 N.W. 305 (1886).
59. An argument can be made for interpreting Jones & Laughlin as drawing a
distinction for seventh amendment purposes between suits brought to vindicate a public
right, as opposed to a private one, with a civil jury trial provided only for the latter. See
Note, The Right to Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37 U.
CHI. L. Rav. 167 (1969).
Although it appears promising at first glance, this test would
be very difficult to apply, particularly in light of Supreme Court decisions upholding the
right to jury trial under other federal statutes, such as the antitrust and patent laws. See
cases cited notes 43-44, 49 supra. The only distinction between those cases and Jones &
Laughlin may be that the latter was brought by the government rather than a private
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courts interpreted the Supreme Court's language broadly, holding proceedings under labor statutes generally to be outside the scope of the
constitutional guarantee. 60 The majority of courts limited the case to its

facts or ignored it, applying the same historical analysis utilized in other
actions.61 A closer look at the facts of Jones & Laughlin provides some
enlightenment.
The proceedings in that case took place before the National Labor
Relations Board, and the question before the Court was essentially
whether the factual findings of that body should be retried by a jury.
Therefore, Chief Justice Hughes may simply have been defining the
right to jury trial with respect to proceedings before an administrative
agency. The decision may reflect only the Court's belief that the jury
trial guarantee does not pose a problem in the field of administrative

law62 and that the decision of Congress to resort to administrative
remedies was appropriate, at least in the labor field.
As a matter of policy this conclusion seems sound. At least in
part, the administrative process is designed to allow a specialized group
of experts to deal with complex problems not easily comprehended by
citizen. But if a statute vests a cause of action arising from the same activities in both
the government and any injured individual, there seems no rational way to treat them
differently for jury trial purposes. Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement
Proceduresand Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 495, 522-23 (1966).
See also Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1121 n.37 (7th Cir. 1972), affd sub nom.
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
60. A case under the Railway Labor Act is Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
196 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del. 1961). See also Nedd v. Thomas, 316 F. Supp. 74 (M.D. Pa.
1970). One case under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act also held
that there was no right to a jury trial under that statute. McGraw v. United Ass'n of
Plumbers, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965). This case was subsequently repudiated in
several suits under the same statute. See cases cited note 61 infra.
61. Jury trial has been allowed under the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act. E.g., International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Simmons v. Textile Workers Local 713,
350 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1965); Paley v. Greenberg, 318 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
However, jury trial has been denied under the act when equitable relief has been sought.
Iron Workers Local 92 v. Norris, 383 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. Painters Local
21, 211 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Jury trial has been upheld under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. E.g., Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries, 73 F. Supp. 273 (W.D.
Pa. 1947). In Martin v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Mich.
1960), the court upheld the provision in the Portal-to-Portal Act that the defense of good
faith must be tried to the court on the ground that jury trial questions are decided on the
basis of the issue involved, and there was no clear right to trial of all issues of good faith
at common law.
62. Brown, Administrative Commissions and the JudicialPower, 19 MINN. L. Rnv.
261 (1935); Note, Application of Constitutional Guarantees of Jury Trial to the
Administrative Process, 56 I-HIv. L. Rnv. 282 (1942).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

the layman. To interject the jury into that system would seriously
impair its utility, as well as impede its effectiveness.6 3 In addition to
these policy considerations, it can be argued that an administrative
remedy typically has been provided whenever resort to the courts was
inadequate. 64 Viewed in this light, the administrative proceeding is
much like the suit in equity, designed for situations in which the
common law does not function well, and is thus outside the scope of the
seventh amendment.
Specialized Courts
The next case in which the Supreme Court addressed the question
of congressional power to provide for nonjury trial was Katchen v.
Landy,65 which involved the question whether a bankruptcy court could
summarily order the surrender of voidable preferences. The creditor
had filed his claim in the bankruptcy court, and the trustee had counterclaimed to recover an alleged voidable preference. If the creditor had
not filed a claim, the only way for the trustee to recover the preference
would have been to sue in state or federal court in which the defendant
would have had a right to a jury trial. 66 The Court upheld the summary proceeding.
Mr. Justice White did note that the bankruptcy court is established
by statute pursuant to article I, section 8. Thus, it is a legislative court,
not an article III court, and arguably may not be subject to the seventh
amendment. 67 However, Justice White refused to rest his decision on
63.

In one case, a statute provided that when an importer challenged a duty

valuation an appraiser would be appointed to set the price and his decision would be
final.

The Court upheld the law against a challenge on seventh amendment grounds,

stating, "No government could collect its revenues or perform its necessary functions, if
the system contended for by the plaintiffs were to prevail." Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137
U.S. 310, 323 (1890).
64. Note, Application of Constitutional Guaranteesof Jury Trial to the Administrative Process, 56 HARv. L. Rv. 282, 293 (1942).
65. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).

66.

Hollywood Nat'l Bank v. Bumb, 409 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Beasley-

Gilbert's Inc., 285 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
67. 382U.S.at336.

In a Tucker Act case, the Court held that the Congress could dispense with jury
trial in actions under the act brought before the Court of Claims since that court is a
legislative court established under article I and since the sovereign had the right to
attach conditions to its consent to be sued. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584
(1941). See generally MOORE, supra note 1, at 1 38.08[1]-[2].

Historically bankruptcy always has been treated as a specialized proceeding not
available at law. See generally Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. RPv. 1
(1940).
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that ground. Rather, he reviewed the background of the Bankruptcy
Act and found that its purpose was to secure the quick administration of
the bankrupt's estate. Even though there was no express reference in
the statute to the summary treatments of preferences, he argued that the
bankruptcy courts characteristically proceeded summarily, that the
"Congress has often left the exact scope of summary proceedings in
bankruptcy undefined,"6 8 and that the question had to be determined
"after due consideration of the structure and purpose of the Bankruptcy

Act as a whole, as well as the particular provisions of the Act brought in
question."6 9 In this way, the Court upheld the power of the Congress

to establish a detailed statutory scheme for handling bankruptcy cases,
to set up a specialized court to hear those cases,7 ° and to provide that

summary adjudication of those matters was both necessary and proper. 71
The Court's decisions in Jones & Laughlin and Katchen, deferring

to legislative attempts to eliminate juries in certain cases in which it was
deemed necessary, mark the apex of the functional test in statutory
actions. Neither case appeared to pose any serious difficulty to the
Court, perhaps because neither involved claims having any close com-

mon law analog.

Thus, it remained unclear just how far Congress

could go in providing for nonjury trial.

Read broadly, the Court's

decisions appeared to uphold the legislature's power to provide for
68. 382 U.S. 323, at 328.
69. Id.
70. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 447 (1944) (Emergency Court of
Appeals).
Because probate matters are treated by specialized courts, they have been held
outside the scope of various state constitutions. See In re Leary's Estate, 175 Misc. 254,
23 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1940). See also In re Littman, 15 Misc. 2d 430, 182 N.Y.S.2d 90
(1958). Thus, divorce actions and incompetency hearings, typically brought in specialized tribunals, have been held outside the state constitutional guarantee. Cassidy v.
Sullivan, 64 Cal. 266, 28 P. 234 (1883) (divorce); People v. Willey, 128 Cal. App. 2d
148, 275 P.2d 522 (1954); In re Bundy, 44 Cal. App. 466, 186 P. 811 (1920); People ex
rel. Lederer v. Johnston, 18 App. Div. 2d 737, 235 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1962); People ex rel.
Powers v. Johnston, 17 App. Div. 2d 872, 233 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1962). These holdings are
not surprising since historically probate matters were handled by the ecclesiastical rather
than the law courts. What is more interesting, however, is that in both California and
New York, there are statutory provisions for jury trial in certain types of actions in
specialized tribunals, even though no such right existed in English law. See CAL. PROB.
CoDn §§ 371, 382, 928, 1081, 1230 (West 1956); N.Y. SuRR. Cr. Paoc. Acr § 502
(McKinney 1967); N.Y. MnNrAL HYomNB LAW § 106(5) (McKinney 1971).
71. Subsequent lower court decisions, relying on Katchen's interpretation of the
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, have upheld summary jurisdiction in other aspects of
bankruptcy proceedings. In re Hinchey, 349 F. Supp. 116 (D. Ore. 1972) (dischargeability); In re IJ. Knight Realty Corp., 298 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (fire loss claim
filed as administrative expense).
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nonjury proceedings when it was necessary to do so. Read narrowly,
actions before specialized courts or boards might be deemed outside the
scope of the seventh amendment only if there was sufficient justification for their altered character.7 2
Non-Jury Trial in Federal District Court
Curtis v. Loether,73 which came before the Court in 1974, presented the set of facts to test the Court's commitment to a more flexible jury
standard in the federal district courts. Loether arose in the Eastern
District of Wisconsin. The plaintiff, a black woman, brought suit under
Title VIII, section 3612, of the 1968 Civil Rights Act 74 claiming that
defendants discriminated against her in violation of the statute by refusing, on account of her race, to rent her an apartment. She sought
injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's
fees. Subsequently, the injunction claim was dropped, 75 and the trial
involved only the monetary claims. The defendants requested a jury
trial on those issues. In a short opinion, the district court denied the
request on the ground that a jury trial was not required either by the
Constitution or by statute. 76 The rationale for the district court's
decision is important to consider to better understand its rejection by
the Supreme Court.
In essence the trial court's decision was based on three findings.
First, the court ruled that under the rationale of Jones & Laughlin, the
cause of action was statutory, "invoking the equity powers of the court,
by which the court may award compensatory and punitive money damages as an integral part of the final decree so that complete relief may be
had."77 Second, it found that Congress, by referring to "the court '78 as
72. Even this limited view of the power of Congress to provide for administrative
adjudications is currently under attack. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
in a case challenging the constitutionality of the Occupational Safety and Health Act as
violative of the seventh amendment insofar as it provides for civil penalties to be levied
by the review commission. Irey v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519
F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd en banc, 519 F.2d 1215 (1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.

1458 (1976).
73. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970 & Supp. IV,1974).
75. The fact that the equitable claim was dropped prior to trial was not deemed
important, for the right to a jury trial is tested by the character of the relief originally
sought in the plaintiff's complaint. Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1118-19 (7th Cir.
1972), aff'd sub nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.l1 (1974).
76. Rogers v. Loether, 312 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
77. Id. at 1009.
78. "The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or
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the grantor of relief, intended the judge to be the sole arbiter of cases
under the statute. 79 Third, the court found precedent for its decision to
deny a jury trial in analogous cases 0 brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19641 for employment discrimination.
The district court opinion, then, appears to present a functional
jury analysis much like the one suggested earlier: the court looked to the
statute, found evidence that nonjury trial was preferred by Congress,
agreed that nonjury trial was the appropriate method of proceeding,
and, relying on Jones & Laughlin, denied the request for a jury. However, this conclusion went far beyond the Supreme Court's earlier decisions, first, because the Civil Rights Act provided for enforcement in the
normal article HI courts and second, because one of the remedies
provided, damages, was historically legal. Thus, this decision upheld
most clearly the power of Congress to implement a functional jury test
in statutory actions.
The Seventh Circuit reversed in a comprehensively researched,
scholarly opinion by Judge Stevens, 82 and the Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals in an unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall. 8 Following Judge Stevens, Justice Marshall avoided the question
of statutory intent; because the seventh amendment required a jury trial,
the statute, which was ambiguous on the issue, was construed to avoid
any question of unconstitutionality.84 The Supreme Court then ruled
that upholding a right to jury trial was justified as a matter of history.
Affirming that statutory causes of action are within the scope of the
temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award to the
plaintiff actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with court
costs and reasonable attorney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff: Provided, That
the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume said
attorney's fees." Civil Rights Act of 1968 § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
79. 312 F. Supp. at 1010. Earlier decisions under the same statute held that the
act provided for an essentially equitable remedy and that compensatory damages were
simply a part of that remedy. Marr v. Rife, 363 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ohio 1973). They
also held that the statutory language placing the award of punitive damages within the
court's discretion and limiting such an award to $1,000 indicated that the statutory relief
was equitable in character. Cauley v. Smith, 347 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Va. 1972). But
see Kelly v. Armbrust, 351 F. Supp. 869 (D.N.D. 1972); Kastner v. Brackett, 326 F.
Supp. 1151 (D. Nev. 1971).
80. Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49 (S.D. Ga. 1969); Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
82. Rogers v.Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972).
Judge Stevens's opinion presents a very detailed historical analysis and is worth
reading.

83.
84.

Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
Id. at 191-92 &n.6.
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seventh amendment, the Court found that the action was one to enforce
"legal rights" in that it was analogous to a tort action for damages. Title
VII cases denying trial on the issue of back pay were distinguished on
the ground that courts in these cases treated back pay as "an integral
part of an equitable remedy,""5 and the decision whether to award it was
left to the trial court's discretion.8 6 Finally, the Court noted that the
petitioner's policy arguments for denying the seventh amendment
to overclaim-jury delay and possible prejudice-were "insufficient
87
come the clear command of the Seventh Amendment.
As should be clear from even this brief recital, Loether serves only
to increase the confusion surrounding the congressional power to provide for nonjury trials when the jury may be dysfunctional. The Court
declined to give extended consideration to any statutory intent or legislative desire to avoid jury prejudice, commenting, "[1It is clear that the
Seventh Amendment entitles either party to demand a jury trial in an
action for damages in the federal court under § 812. ' '88 On the other
hand, the Court was careful to point out the sparsity and ambiguity of
the legislative history. 9 Later, the Court asserted, "We are not oblivious to the force of petitioner's policy arguments." 9 Yet the policy
argument of jury prejudice was ruled "insufficient to overcome the clear
command of the Seventh Amendment."' 91
While the Court's position on the issue of congressional power to
modify the historical approach to civil jury trial rights is ambivalent,
certain other language strongly suggests that the functional approach
has survived the decision in Loether:
But when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in
an ordinary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no functional justification for denying the jury trial right, a
and remejury trial must be available if the action involves rights
92
dies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law.
This language implies that the Court did consider but rejected argu85. Id. at 197.
86. The Court did not note that the provision for punitive damages in the instant
statute contained the same characteristics as the back pay provision. See Cauley v.
Smith, 347 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Va. 1972). Rather, the Court treated both statutory
damage provisions under Title VIII simultaneously. Thus the question remains whether
claims for punitive damages are entitled to a jury trial.
87. 415 U.S. at 198.
88. Id. at 192.
89. Id. at 191.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
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ments that Congress intended to dispense with juries or that the functional limitations of juries militated against their use in civil rights
cases.93 Such an interpretation of the Court's treatment of congressional intent seems most sound and reconciles Loether with those earlier
decisions in which Congress had expressed clear and compelling reasons
for treating actions under the National Labor Relations Act and the
Bankruptcy Act as outside the scope of the seventh amendment. 94
Another possible explanation of the Court's decision is that consideration of practical factors can be used to expand jury trial rights but
never to contract them. This interpretation, however, is quite unsatisfactory. It is true in a manner of speaking that there are no constitutional barriers to expanding jury trial rights; use of a functional test to
justify the Court's expansion of such rights poses few problems. However, to acknowledge that a more difficult constitutional problem is
posed when policy considerations would result in narrowing the scope of
the seventh amendment should not prevent all movement in that direction. It merely suggests that we must proceed cautiously. The Court,
at least from the time of Beacon Theatres, has taken great care to
explain that the law-equity distinction in 1791 existed in large measure
because the legal remedy was inadequate. Changes in modem procedure removing various deficiencies also did away with the need for the
intervention of the equity court, so that jury trial might now be required
in cases which historically had been tried in equity.95 Conversely, if
factors demonstrate that the current legal remedy is inadequate, then,
using this flexible interpretation of history, the case should be deemed
within the equitable jurisdiction of the court.
Some further clarification of the Supreme Court's position can be
gleaned from its decision in Pernell v. Southall Realty,90 a jury trial
decision rendered shortly after Loether. In Pernell the Supreme Court
considered whether a jury trial was required in a landlord's action for
93. Other interpretations of Loether might be: a desire to avoid the difficult
problem of defining the scope of congressional power in light of the seventh amendment;
that jury prejudice is not to be considered a practical limitation of the jury; that
congressional findings on that factor are irrelevant; or that the pragmatic factors referred
to in Ross v. Bernhard are to be used to justify expanding but not contracting civil jury
trial rights.
94. Mr. Justice Marshall distinguished Katchen and Jones & Laughlin on the
ground that they involved legislative schemes that relied on enforcement through
administrative proceedings or specialized courts, rather than by the normal civil action.
415 U.S. at 194-95. Thus, the fact that nonjury trial was upheld in those cases did not
compel a similar result in Loether.
95. See text accompanying notes 24-39 supra.
96. 416 U.S. 363 (1974), noted in 24 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 155 (1974).
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the summary recovery of possession of real property under the District
of Columbia Code. 7 An earlier statute governing those suits had
contained an explicit jury trial provision,98 but amendments made by the
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 197099 repealed that
provision placing nothing in its stead. Thus, at least by negative
implication, the Court had definite evidence of a congressional desire to
dispense with jury trials in those cases, and, indeed, the Court in Pernell
felt that it was not possible to find a statutory right to jury trial under
those circumstances. 1 0 Nevertheless, it held that the seventh amendment required a jury trial regardless of the desires of Congress. Short
shrift was given to arguments that juries would delay and clog the courts
in these cases, contrary to the express purpose of the 1970 act, and the
Court employed an historical analysis to reach its decision.
In some ways, Pernell casts further gloom on the prospect of a
functional jury trial test because of the Court's refusal, once again, to
deal with the effect of jury trials on the adequacy of the remedy. But
still, Congress in Pernell did not expressly dispense with trial by jury for
this statutory cause of action. It is possible to read both Pernell and
Loether as requiring an express congressional intent to proscribe jury
trials and clear findings that the remedy would be made inadequate if a
jury trial were required.
Summary
In summary, the following observations can be made about the
scope of congressional power in the jury trial area. If Congress
wants to provide for summary proceedings in areas traditionally tried at
law, it must do so explicitly and with clearly expressed, well-documented
reasons why a jury trial has become an inadequate procedure. Congress cannot simply provide that a statutory cause of action which
historically would have required a jury trial 0 1 must now be tried to
97. D.C. CODEANN. § 16-1501 (1970).
98. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, § 1, 77 Stat. 517.
99. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 142(5) (A), 84 Stat. 552.
100. 416 U.S. at 366.
101. One exception to the rule that the Congress must provide for jury trial in all
actions "at common law" appears in the Insular Cases. The Supreme Court held that in
actions brought in territories that were previously civil law jurisdictions, the Congress
could provide that the federal courts sitting therein should attempt to preserve the local
law even if some aspect of that law provided for proceedings before a judge in certain
cases that at common law would have been tried to a jury. See, e.g., Perez v. Fernandez,
202 U.S. 80 (1906). This exception is strictly limited to those facts, however, and
represents a deference to the preferences of a people for whom jury trial was not
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the court.10 2 To hold otherwise would allow the Congress to subvert the policy and principle of the seventh amendment. For the
same reasons, Congress cannot abrogate the jury trial guarantee by
passing a statute simply referring what were historically common law
suits,

0 3

such as negligence cases, to an administrative board. 0 4

The

indigenous and a desire to allow territories to preserve some of their heritage, making
their attachments to the United States as free from burden as possible. Under this
reasoning, sixth amendment criminal jury trial rights also have been held inapplicable.
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904).
102. Martin v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 579, 581 (E.D. Mich.
1960). See, e.g., Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437, 460 (1851).
Two authors have presented evidence to the effect that in 1791 Chancery did not
actually exercise authority to decide fact issues, but rather referred those questions to the
law courts or special juries so that, were the constitutional language applied literally, jury
trial rights would adhere in almost all cases; .thus, Congress could not proscribe jury
trials even in suits not historically brought "at common law." Chesnin & Hazard,
Chancery Procedure and the Seventh Amendment: Jury Trial of Issues in Equity Cases
Before 1791, 83 YALE LJ. 999 (1974). They further argue, however, that a rigid
interpretation is probably unjustified, as well as undesirable, and that the seventh
amendment is better viewed as a compromise of the jury system then existing so that the
congressional power to provide for nonjury trial should not be so limited. The validity
of Chesnin's and Hazard's finding has been disputed. Langbein, Fact Finding in the
English Court of Chancery: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE LJ. 1620 (1974).
103. Judge Wisdom has declared that "[ihe encroachments on the civil jury
occasioned by classification of cases as outside of the 'Suits at common law' category has
been exceeded only by encroachments brought about by total abolition of the civil jury."
Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1041 (E.D. La. 1972), affd sub nom. Hill
v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972) (per curiam), and Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098
(1973) (per curiam).
104. The history of workmen's compensation laws in New York is illustrative of the
problems that may be faced by a legislature attempting to withdraw a formerly common
law cause of action from the scope of the jury trial guarantee. In 1910 New York
passed a workmen's compensation law, article 14-A of the Labor Law of 1909, L. 1910,
ch. 674, establishing a scheme to provide for automatic recovery from employers for
occupational injury unless an employee was found guilty of wilful or gross misconduct.
This statute essentially eliminated the fellow servant, assumption of risk and contributory
negligence rules that had been part of the common law cause of action. The statute was
challenged, inter alia, as a deprivation of the state constitutional right to a jury trial on
the question of the amount the employer should pay when his liability was fixed. Ives v.
South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (Ct. App. 1911). In 1913, a constitutional amendment was adopted stating that nothing in the constitution should be construed to
limit the powers of the legislature to provide for workmen's compensation and to make it
the exclusive remedy for work related injuries. N.Y. CONST., art. 1, § 19 (1894)
(renumbered § 18, Nov. 8, 1938).
Similar problems have arisen when states have adopted only partial no fault plans,
retaining some aspects of the former tort remedy. Thus, for example, the Illinois
Supreme Court struck down such a plan because, among other things, it violated the right
to jury trial. Grace v. Howlett, 51 IIl. App. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972), noted in 8
GONZAGA L. REv. 146 (1972).
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Jones & Laughlin case, although it does protect the right of the legislature to establish administrative proceedings, does not go so far. There
must be some compelling reason why the problem needs to be handled
administratively rather than in the courts; some finding must be made
that trial by jury provides an inadequate remedy.
Exceptions to these general rules appear only in certain welldefined circumstances. For example, if the character of the action is
drastically altered so that it no longer resembles its common law counterpart, such as in statutes providing for worker's compensation °5 and

no fault insurance, 1

6

a jury trial may not be required.

Legislation

providing for administrative determinations of common law matters also
has been upheld during time of emergency as an appropriate exercise of
war powers by Congress. 1 7 This too is necessarily a very limited
105. Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 180, 206, 119 P.
554, 560 (1911). See In re Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. 562, 35 N.E.2d 1 (1941).
A federal workmen's compensation act appears in the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974). The
constitutionality of the statute was upheld in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45 (1932),
the Court noting that there were no jury trial problems because the transformed cause of
action previously existed in admiralty, rather than at common law. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia later upheld the statute on the broader
ground that the Congress had the power to create a substitute right unknown at common
law and could abolish the traditional right in so doing because "[t]he object . . . is to
protect society from pauperism by preserving the home and family, and thus performing
a duty for which governments are formed." Rowlette v. Rothstein Dental Labs., Inc., 63
F.2d 150, 152 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 736 (1933).
Accord, Scrinko v.
Reading Co., 117 F. Supp. 603, 609-10 (D.N.J. 1954).
Similarly, some states have upheld the state legislature's power to abrogate the
former tort remedy for the worker as a legitimate exercise of state police power. E.g.,
Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill. App. 167, 125 N.E. 748 (1920);
Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 156 Md. 482, 144 A. 696 (1929); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 309 Mass. 562, 35 N.E.2d 1 (1941); State ex rel. Davis-Smith
Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 P. 1101 (1911).
Some early cases noted that the jury trial question arose only in the context of the
employer's rights since workmen's compensation acts at that time sometimes provided
that the employee had a choice whether to proceed in the courts, in which case a jury
would be available, or before the board. E.g., Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 175
Iowa 245, 154 N.W. 1037 (1916); Leon's Case, 239 Mass. 1, 131 N.E. 196 (1921).
106. A total no fault insurance system is designed to provide compensation to auto
accident victims without having to wait to determine fault. It alters the traditional tort
remedy by abolishing relief for pain and suffering. Thus, it is argued, by providing a
new substitute remedy, which may be deemed equitable, it withdraws the action from the
scope of the jury trial guarantee. See, e.g., Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d
1291 (1974); R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BAsIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
491-93 (1965); Hart, The Constitutionality of the New York State Comprehensive
Automobile InsuranceReparations Act, 43 FoRDHAM L. REv. 379, 385-86 (1974).
107. E.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1921).
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exception. Only when the statute creates what appears to be a novel
cause of action unknown in 18th century England, or one that was not
within the jurisdiction of the law court, does it seem totally within the
discretion of the Congress to decide how that action is to be tried.
As these cases upholding administrative proceedings illustrate,
Beacon Theatres' reliance on the adequacy of the current legal remedy,
taken with the Supreme Court's reference in Ross to the practical
limitations of jury trial, should permit Congress to require nonjury
trial for a cause of action which it deems equitable. Under Jones &
Laughlin, Congress is only required to find that trial by jury provides
an inadequate means for resolving certain types of disputes. In
doing so, Congress would be creating a remedy outside the jurisdiction
of the historic law courts. The Supreme Court did not explicitly reject
this approach in either Loether or Pernell; it merely, quite properly,
placed a very heavy burden of proof on those desiring to overcome the

constitutional presumption for jury trial.
The Functional Test: A Prognosis
Effect of Loether on the Lower Courts
We need not merely hypothesize about the effect of Loether in civil
rights and other actions. A recent case under section 1983 of Title 42
of the United States Code,1 8 Van Ermen v. Schmidt, 09 indicates that
the trial courts have learned their lesson well. The plaintiff in Van
Ermen brought suit in federal court challenging several state prison
regulations preventing inmates from having access to law books. He
sought both injunctive relief and damages. Prior to Loether, several
other suits had been brought under the same statute, and courts generally had held that there was no right to jury trial.":0 Although some of
these cases involved employment discrimination seeking back pay and
thus rested on findings that such relief was equitable,"' others generat108. Section 1983 permits suits against state officials who violate a plaintiff's civil
rights. The section dates from the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
109. 374 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
110. McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 934 (1972); Harkless v. Sweeney Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360
F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966); Buss v. Douglas, 59 F.R.D. 334 (D. Neb. 1973); Lawton v.
Nightingale, 345 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Ohio 1972). But see Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd on other grounds sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456
F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
111. McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 934 (1972); Harkless v. Sweeney Indep. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.
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ed broader holdings. 112 Thus, there was clear authority on which the
Van Ermen court could have rested a decision that the seventh amendment was not applicable. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Loether" 3
explicitly refrained from ruling on the extent to which Congress could
impinge upon the seventh amendment under its power to enforce the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, 1 4 and that argument thus remained viable.
Nevertheless, the Van Ermen court upheld the demand for jury
trial. Perhaps this result is not very surprising in light of the separate
and distinct claim for monetary relief that was presented." 5 Far more
important, Van Ermen assumed that Loether had refused comment
(and therefore was neutral) on the Ross footnote that permitted functional jury limitations to affect the scope of the seventh amendment;
Van Ermen also assumed that the Loether rejection of jury prejudice
meant only that Congress intended, not that the seventh amendment
demanded, trial by jury for civil rights actions."" The Ross reference
to practical jury limitations was held to embrace only jury competence to
handle complex issues, and without specific guidance from the Supreme
Court, the Van Ermen court refused to make jury prejudice a seventh
1 17
amendment limitation.
Although Van Ermen suggests the beleaguered functional approach is still alive, it illustrates quite starkly the possible broad effect of
the Loether decision in the civil rights field,"' as well as in other
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Smith v. Hampton Training School of Nurses,
360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966).
112. Buss v. Douglas, 59 F.R.D. 334 (D. Neb. 1973); Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F.
Supp. 683 (N.D. Ohio 1972).

In Jones v. Wittenberg, prisoners in a county jail brought suit claiming cruel and
unusual punishment and unequal protection and seeking injunctive relief and punitive
damages. 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), ai'd on other grounds sub nom. Jones v.

Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).

The court held that civil rights suits are

basically equitable, but noted that within that circuit it had been held that questions of
punitive damages were to be fixed by a jury. Id. at 721, citing National Union Elec.
Corp. v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 986 (6th Cir. 1970). However, the court ultimately refused

to reconcile these contrary propositions on the ground that damages were not warranted
in the instant case.
113. 415 U.S. 189, 198 n.15.
114. See generally Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the
Federal Anti-DiscriminationLaws, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1019 (1969).
115. In another prisoner suit prior to Loether in which only damages were sought,

the court granted a jury trial on the ground that the action was analogous to a common
law suit in tort. Cook v. Cox, 357 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1973).
116. 374 F. Supp. at 1074 & n.9, 1075.

117.

Id. at 1075.

118.

An excellent discussion of the effect of the Supreme Court's recent jury trial
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statutory contexts. 119 And the Van Ermen court probably was correct
in deferring to the Supreme Court's reluctance to narrow the scope of
the seventh amendment on the basis of an unsubstantiated concern that
a jury could undermine the purpose and policy of the statute.
With that approach in mind, whether future employment discrimination cases seeking back pay also will be affected is open to question.
Although the Supreme Court properly declined to express any view as to
the propriety of decisions that had refused jury trial under other civil
rights statutes, 120 the approach and philosophy of the Court in dealing
with the Title VIII suits necessarily will affect similar decisions under
other titles. A brief examination of some of those cases illustrates this
point.
The courts appear to have relied on three basic grounds to support
their findings that a jury trial is not required in the employment discrim-

ination suits.

First, Title VII presents a comprehensive equitable

scheme for dealing with discrimination, which was unknown at common

law, 12' and back pay is only a small but necessary 121 part of that
remedial scheme. 12 3

Back pay also has been held to be equitable

decisions on employment discrimination cases is provided in Comment, Jury Trial in
Employment Discrimination Cases-ConstitutionallyMandated? 53 TEXAs L. REv. 483
(1975).
119. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 62134 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), it has been held that because the Congress provided only
money remedies, damages, for statutory violations, actions under those provisions must
be deemed legal. Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco Corp., 501 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.
1974); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 69 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Chilton v.
National Cash Register Co., 370 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Ohio 1974). Contra, Pons v.
Lorillard, 69 F.R.D. 576 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
120. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974).
121. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
122. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line
R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49 (S.D. Ga. 1968).
123. Several courts have simply stated that back pay is an equitable remedy, like
restitution. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971); King v. Laborers Local 817, 443 F.2d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 1971)
(dictum); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969); Moss v. Lane Co., 50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970) (by implication); Brown v.
Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 33 CCH EMPL. PRAC. DEC. % 8044 (W.D.N.C.
1970).
A federal district court in Texas adhered to Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
Inc. even though it specifically found that back pay had an historical counterpart in the
common law action for breach of contract by wrongful discharge. Ochoa v. American
Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Tex. 1972).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

because, although a money judgment does result, it is unlike typical
damage relief since it is easily calculable... and, by statute, is discretionary with the court. 12 5 Second, it has been held that the statutory

language indicates that the court is to try all issues. 1 6 Third, it has
been argued that juries are inadequate to deal with the issues raised in
these cases. Jury verdicts cannot insure the uniformity of decision important to implement the policies behind the statute, 2 7 as the issues
are complex, technical and beyond the competence of juries. 28 Ad-

ditionally, there is a substantial danger of jury prejudice and a danger of
delay when the need for timely relief is compelling.' 2 9
Although the Loether Court did not specifically reject any of these
arguments, in dictum it refused to adopt the Seventh Circuit's characterization of the employment discrimination cases as "equitable.' 3 ° This

may be some indication of disapproval of that finding.

The Loether

Court's rejection of the policy considerations favoring nonjury trial in

housing discrimination suits' 3 1 may indicate the Court's reluctance to
accept such arguments in other contexts, at least without further evidence of their validity.
124. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Comment, The Right to Jury Trial
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 37 U. Cai. L. REv. 167, 173 (1969).
125. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969);
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232 (N.D. Ga. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970); Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement
Procedures and Relief and Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 495, 514 (1966).
126. The courts pointed to language in the enforcement provision, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (Supp. IV 1974), that "the court" shall determine what relief should be
granted. This interpretation was buttressed by the fact that in another section it is
stated that any criminal contempt suits under the statute shall be tried to the jury. 42
U.S.C. § 2000h (1970). See, e.g., Lowry v. Whitaker Cable Corp., 348 F. Supp. 202
(W.D. Mo. 1972), affd per curiam, 472 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1973); Moss v. Lane Co.,
50 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. Va. 1970); Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F.
Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 296 F. Supp. 1232
(N.D. Ga. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970).
127. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1264 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Employment Discrimination].
128. "Unequal opportunity in job classifications and in promotions, the establishment of new seniority lists, dealing with historically segregated departments, the equalization of pay in separate job classifications but comparable work-in all of this a jury is
at best ill-equipped to make determinations of so sophisticated issues involving so
complicated computations." Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 46 F.R.D. 49, 53 (S.D.
Ga. 1968); accord,Employment Discrimination,supra note 127, at 1264.
129. Employment Discrimination,supra note 127, at 1264-65.
130. 415 U.S. at 197.
131. Id. at 198. But see text accompanying notes 87-90 supra.
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Interestingly, in at least three Title VII cases 8 2 decided since
Loether, the courts have denied jury trials on issues of back pay, relying
on their characterization of the relief as a form of restitution' 8" and of
84
the legislation as an equitable scheme to foster a particular policy.
However, the courts have never faced seriously the question whether
Congress was justified in deciding that only equitable remedies would be
appropriate. Also, they appear to have ignored the Loether Court's
determination that at least part of the legislative civil rights scheme
involves legal remedies. 8 5 These failures are particularly critical in
light of the Supreme Court's apparent reluctance to adopt a statutory
policy approach for denying jury trial in Title VIII actions. Nonetheless, the Title VII cases provide some hope that a functional jury trial
test, based on a congressional decision to require judge trials, has not
been ruled out.
Problems of Proving Jury Inadequacy
The ability of the legislature, as well as lawyers, to make a compelling argument for nonjury trial would be greatly enhanced if more
detailed data on the jury were available. It is somewhat surprising that
in our science oriented society so little is currently known about the
actual functions of the jury, the tasks at which it is most adept, and when
it is least effective. We can find pages of rhetoric on the question, but
few helpful facts. The most detailed, complete attempt to study the judge
and jury roles was made by the Chicago Jury Project over a decade ago;
unfortunately, their published findings center on the criminal jury, not
the civil jury. 36 Nonetheless, that project, by its very existence, indi132. Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.,
515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 n.4 (D. Hawaii
1974).
133. One commentator also has argued that reliance by the Title VII courts on a
restitution theory may be misplaced and that back pay could be characterized as ordinary
contract damages based on the plaintiffs expectation interest. Comment, Jury Trial in
Employment DiscriminationCases-ConstitutionallyMandated?, 53 TXAs L. Rlv. 483,
499 (1975).
134. The technique of characterizing legislation as providing an equitable scheme
for handling a problem so that monetary relief may be treated as part of the equitable
proceedings was recently employed in a suit for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974). Cayman Music, Ltd. v. Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp.
794 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
135. See EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975).
136. Although several articles were published during the existence of the study, the
most complete record of its findings appears in H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, Tim AMERICAN
JuRy (1966).
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cates that useful and needed facts about the civil jury can be gleaned by
similar methods. Other studies gathering comparative data on the
difference between twelve and six member juries also point the way. 117
Just when or how the jury is to be proved inadequate is beyond the
scope of this article. However, I will suggest a few factors which might
be studied simply to demonstrate the types of findings that could be
considered. Probably the two most obvious factors are possible jury
prejudice and jury inadequacy in certain types of highly complex litigation."3 " Unfortunately, both of these are very difficult to ascertain.
Perhaps the only way to do so would be to gather statistics that would
tend to establish a presumption of prejudice or inadequacy. Illustratively, Congress, in enacting civil rights legislation, could consider how
many suits under similar statutes have been tried to a jury, which party
demanded the jury, and whether any claims of discrimination were
upheld. Perhaps no discernible pattern would emerge, in which case a
right to jury trial should be accorded. On the other hand, if it evolved
that in virtually all civil rights cases of a certain kind juries were
demanded by defendants who later won, whereas the results were not so
predictable in judge-tried cases, this evidence might be considered adequate for Congress to provide for trial by the court.
Delay and uniformity of jury verdicts would be subjects more
conducive to study. If the time required to process a jury case is found
to be substantially greater because of the longer court dockets in jury
actions and Congress has concluded that the remedy or enforcement of
a particular statute must be swift to be effective, then such findings
could provide support for dispensation of jury trials. Similarly, if
uniformity of regulation is especially important in order to foster a
particular policy, then the court and the legislature might take into
137. E.g., Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research
and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. RaV. 643 (1975); Ziesel & Diamond, "Convincing
Empirical Evidence" on the Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI.L. REv. 281 (1974).

138.

There has long been a debate about the use of the so-called "blue ribbon" jury

composed of experts, rather than community members chosen at random, to deal with
certain types of cases. See generally Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon" Jury, 35
IOWA L. REv. 409 (1950).
The question instead should be: why the jury at all?

Historically certain cases, such as accountings, were tried in equity because they were
deemed too complicated for the then unsophisticated, illiterate jury members. Dairy
Queen suggests that jury incompetence has been lessened in many fields and it is true
that illiteracy may no longer be a jury problem. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Woods, 369 U.S.
469 (1962). Nonetheless, litigation also has become more technical and complex and a
study should be made of the level of compexity at which the jury ceases to function
effectively.
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consideration evidence that jury verdicts in the area, or in similar fields,
have been haphazard and nonuniform.
Needless to say, the above suggestions are merely broad
outlines for possible approaches. Indeed, their very vagueness points
out the extreme difficulties in designing reliable methods to test jury
competency. But the search for more data on jury limitations must
begin somewhere. The question whether juries should be used in any or
all cases persists, but without more pragmatic, useful data to answer it,
the courts will continue to fall back on familiar and easily distortable history in order to define what appears to be an infinitely expansible
concept of a legal claim.
Conclusion
In 1830, Mr. Justice Story enunciated a frequently quoted proposition regarding civil jury trial:
The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people. It has always been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and 139
every encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.
One hundred and forty-four years later the Supreme Court in Curtis v.
Loether faithfully adhered to that principle. While there may have been
ample justification for Mr. Justice Story to extol the civil jury when he
did, developments since then at the least require a reevaluation of that
mode of trial.
The trend in modem civil procedure has been away from rigid,
formalistic tests toward more flexible. pragmatic approaches. In general, the Supreme Court seems to have approved of this trend, even in the
face of constitutional challenges. Thus, in the field of personal jurisdiction, the Court established the "minimum contacts" 140 test to replace
historical principles of territoriality, 4 ' which rested on strict notions of
state sovereignty. Similarly, it has been held that judgments in class
actions 142 and other representative suits143 are binding on absent members if attempts have been made to notify them, despite due process
objections that each individual must be given a day in court. In neither
of these examples were constitutional concerns abandoned. Rather, the
139.
140.
141.
142.
255 U.S.
143.

Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 445 (1830).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 ,(1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
356 (1921).
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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Court interpreted due process broadly in keeping with the needs of
modem day litigants and courts.
The language and purpose of the seventh amendment does not
prevent the Supreme Court from adopting a functional, nonhistorical
approach both to expand and to contract the right to a civil jury trial.
The right to a civil jury symbolizes, among other things, notions of fair
trial. The decision whether an action falls within the language of the
constitutional guarantee may depend upon whether jury trial provides
an adequate legal remedy. Thus, if the seventh amendment is read as a
rigid historical rule, it not only may be dysfunctional, but in some
instances it actually may pose a threat to justice.
For a period of time the Supreme Court appeared to be moving
toward this conclusion. After more than 150 years of reliance upon
pre-1791 history, the Court, in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
considered how an English court would treat a claim in light of changed
circumstances and more adequate legal remedies. The Court was hesitant at first, attributing the jury trial right in antitrust cases to the intent
of Congress rather than to the dictates of the Constitution. However, in
Dairy Queen v. Woods the preference for jury trial was squarely
grounded in the seventh amendment. Finally, in Ross v. Bernhard, the
Court modified the Beacon Theatres test of looking at the claims being
asserted, stating that the right to jury trial depended on the issues
involved. This development was particularly confusing because it offered no logical stopping place. The attempt to label issues as legal
rather than equitable was not even as fruitful as an historical inquiry and
in time became hopeless.
Ross did seem to offer in one footnote a guide to the future. There
were, after all, some predicates for judgment. One was history; another
was assessments of the practical limitations upon the functions of juries.
The Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin and Katchen v. Landy seemed
inclined to consider issues such as the complexity of the subject matter
and the need for speedy adjudications as justification for congressional
abandonment of trial by jury in deference to new administrative remedies and specialized courts. Curtis v. Loether and Pernell v. Southall
Realty might have been seen as paradigm cases, inviting the Court to
utilize this functional approach in order to restrict jury trial rights in the
federal courts for the first time. Instead, the Supreme Court expressed
a preference for jury trial so powerful that possible congressional indications to the contrary were barely explored, although they existed.
Moreover, the Court entirely overlooked the Ross reference to possible
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limitations upon juries, summarily rejecting arguments about jury
prejudice. Did the Court reject a functional interpretation of the seventh amendment, one that would have balanced evenly the concerns
involved, and if so, why? We can only guess at the answer to that
question. 1 44 However, it appears from the facts in both Loether and

Pernell that neither the Congress nor the parties presented any facts to
support the claim of jury inadequacy. In addition, Congress had not
expressly proscribed trial by jury.

Thus, the absence of sufficient

evidence may have deterred the Court from experimenting with a functional test to restrict the scope of jury trial rights.
Can there be a case, or a statutory action, in which a jury is denied
upon a showing that Congress has expressed a reasonable preference for
nonjury trial or that the jury is ill-suited to the litigation whereas the

judge is not? Such a result has not yet occurred, except perhaps in the
lower court decisions in the employment discrimination cases, which the
Supreme Court seems almost to disapprove in Loether. However, it
does seem that a truly functional approach could be adopted, and that
the Court's reference in Ross to the practical limitations of the jury is not
dead, but only slumbering. The task for the future is to develop
sufficiently reliable data on which the legislature and the courts can rely

in order to overcome the constitutional presumption for trial by jury.
144. One explanation for the Court's adherence to jury trial in Curtis v. Loether
could be that the jury, even if its decisions were subject to severe racial prejudice,
actually was fulfilling its historic role insofar as it reflected community attitudes at odds
with the law as it exists on the books. In this sense, the jury would be serving as an
escape route for substantive law deemed out of step with social reality. See FRNY, supra
note 1, at 127. However, this rationale must fail in circumstances like those in Loether,
where it is decided that local prejudice is itself the problem and legislation enforced by
the courts is necessary to root out that prejudice. To hold otherwise would prevent any
and all schemes to curb prejudice that is deemed unconstitutional-a ridiculous and
intolerable state of affairs.

